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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
vs. : 
EDWARD DOVELL SPINKS, : Case No. 20010985-CA 
Defendants/Appellants : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of one count of murder, a first degree 
felony in violation of U.C.A. 76-5-203 (2000). On October 18, 2001, Judge 
Stanton M. Taylor signed an entry of judgment, sentence and commitment 
sentencing the Defendant to serve a term of five years to life at the Utah State 
Prison. On October 31, 2001, the Defendant filed a notice of appeal. This Court 
has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to the pour-over provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT BY 
REFERRING TO MATTERS WHICH THE JURY WASN'T 
JUSTIFIED IN CONSIDERING IN DETERMING THEIR VERDICT. 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In determining whether a given statement 
constitutes prosecutorial misconduct, the statement must be viewed in light of the 
totality of the evidence presented at trial. See, State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 
927 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Because the issue was not raised with the trial court it 
should be analyzed under a plain error standard of review. "[T]o establish the 
existence of plain error and to obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that was 
not properly objected to, the appellant must show the following: (i) an error exists, 
(ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant. . ." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO 
CONFRONT WITNESSES WAS VIOLATED WHEN 
HEARSAY EVIDENCE WAS ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE 
THROUGH DETECTIVE LUCAS. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine whether the 
trial court committed plain error when the hearsay statements of several witnesses 
were allowed during the trial. Because the issue was not raised with the trial court 
it should be analyzed under a plain error standard of review. "[T]o establish the 
existence of plain error and to obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that was 
not properly objected to, the appellant must show the following: (i) an error exists, 
(ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
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harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant..." State v. Dunn 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
POINT HI 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF 
THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, 
SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION WHEN HIS ATTORNEYS FAILED TO 
OBJECT TO HEARSAY AND IMPROPER CHARACTER 
EVIDENCE, WHEN THEY FAILED TO ASK FOR A 
MISTRIAL WHEN THE PROSECUTOR DIDN'T PRODUCE 
ALL OF THE EVIDENCE WHICH HE REFERRED TO IN HIS 
OPENING STATEMENT, AND WHEN HIS ATTORNEYS 
FAILED TO PRESENT AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine as a matter 
of fact and law whether the Defendant was denied his right to effective assistance 
of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), 
the United States Supreme Court articulated a two part test, which was adopted in 
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine whether counsel was 
ineffective. The Court held that; 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. 
This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 
not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's 
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliable. 
Id. at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. 
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POINT IV 
THE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A 
FAIR TRIAL WAS VIOLATED BECAUSE OF THE 
NUMEROUS ERRORS THAT OCCURRED DURING HIS 
TRIAL. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine whether the 
cumulative effect of the errors during the trial deprived the Defendant a fair trial. 
"Under the cumulative error doctrine, we will reverse only if 'the cumulative effect 
of the several errors undermines our confidence . . . that a fair trial was had.'" 
State v. Colwell, 994 P.2d 177 (Utah 2000)(quoting State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 
262, 277 (Utah 1998)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Sixth Amendment 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, 
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in 
his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence. 
Fourteenth Amendment 
Section 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
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person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article 1, Section 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Article 1, Section 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted 
by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance 
of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of 
the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. 
Utah Code Annotated 
76-5-203 
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if: 
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor 
commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death 
of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to 
human life, the actor engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of 
death to another and thereby causes the death of another; 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 404(b) other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident. 
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Rule 802 Hearsay Rule 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In the early morning hours of May 21, 2000, the body of Tonya Stevens was 
found in her apartment. She had been stabbed sixty-seven times. Later in that 
same day detectives from the Ogden Police Department were scouring the 
surrounding neighborhood when they found some bloody levis that were hidden 
under an old truck. Upon further investigation they found a shirt, boxer shorts and 
a hat. They also found the victim's purse under the truck. A neighbor boy told the 
detectives that he thought the hat belonged to Edward Spinks (Defendant). 
Another neighbor told the detectives that the clothes were the Defendant's. A 
palm print was found inside the victim's apartment and a fingerprint was found on 
the door handle. The prints were identified by crime scene investigators as 
belonging to the Defendant. 
The Defendant was interviewed by detectives a couple of days later. He 
confessed to stabbing Tonya five times. He was charged with murder, a first 
degree felony. The Defendant was convicted of murder by a jury. On October 5, 
2001 the Defendant was sentenced to serve a term of five years to life at the Utah 
State Prison by the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor. On October 31, 2001, the 
Defendant filed a notice of appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Defendant was charged with murder, a first degree felony. The 
Defendant pled not guilty to the charge and a jury trial was held before the 
Honorable Stanton M. Taylor on August 7, 8, 9, 10 and 13, 2001. The Jury found 
the Defendant guilty of the murder of Tonya Stevens. 
The evidence presented to the jury showed that the victim lived at 563 West 
24th Street, Number 13, in Ogden, Utah. On or about May 20, 2000, the victim's 
body was found by friends. She had been stabbed sixty-seven times. While 
officers were scouring the neighborhood for clues they found some clothes and the 
victim's purse under the bed of a pick-up truck. 
While the officers were examining the clothes, some neighbors came 
outside. They told the officers that the clothing belonged to the Defendant. 
During the State's opening statement, the prosecutor, the prosecutor, told the jury 
that these neighbors had identified the clothing as the Defendant's. The 
prosecutor stated to the jury; "At first Dorinda thought the hat belonged to her son 
who was the boy, Daniel Moore, who was on the steps who said go ahead you can 
go back there. Moore came out and looked at the hat and said, that's not my hat, it 
is Edward Spinks' hat." R. 280/116. Even though the prosecutor told the jury that 
Daniel Moore had identified the hat as the Defendant's he was not called to testify 
during the trial. 
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The prosecutor also told the jury that "Leota Ray in whose home the 
defendant lives some of the time, took a look at the clothing; pants, definitely 
Spinks; hat, unquestionably Spinks; underwear, I wash it all the time; Spinks 
shirt, I'm not so sure of, could be, I'm just not certain about the shirt. So he has an 
identification of the clothes as belonging to the Defendant." R. 280/117. Leota 
Ray did not testify during the trial. 
The State called Detective Dave Lucas as its first witness. Detective Lucas 
testified concerning the circumstances when they discovered the clothing under the 
truck. Mr. Daines asked Detective Lucas "Did you identify the owner of the hat?" 
Detective Lucas responded, "yes." Mr Daines then said, "Describe for the jury 
how this happened?" Detective Lucas answered "When the hat came out, we 
showed the hat to Dorinda and asked her, do you have any idea who's hat this is. 
And there was a boy there. I think his first name is Daniel now as I recall. And he 
says, yeah. That looks like somebody I know. And I says, well, whose is it? And 
he says, I think that's Damian Moore's hat. And Dorinda says, no. No. that's not 
it. That's not Damian's. And then they both realized, oh, this is Edward Spinks' 
hat." R. 281/ 47. The Defendant's attorneys did not object to this hearsay and 
neither Daniel nor Dorinda testified during the trial. 
The prosecutor asked Detective Lucas if he made contact with Melissa 
Padilla. R. 281/54. Detective Lucas answered "yes." The prosecutor asked him if 
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he learned something about the case from speaking to Melissa. Detective Lucas 
answered, "Edward Spinks had made a phone call from Tonya's house over to 
2470 "B" Avenue at 11:23 P.M." The prosecutor asked "did she tell you how she 
had learned that?" Detective Lucas answered "From speaking to Dorinda 
Blankenship." R. 281/54. 
A short time later, during the examination of Detective Lucas, the prosecutor 
announced that there was a stipulation concerning what Dorinda would testify to. 
The prosecutor stated that, "Dorinda has subsequently moved out of the area since 
this took place. If she were called to testify, she would testify that she arose in the 
morning of the - and if I go too far, but I'm just going - on the morning of the 20 
of May. And of course they live in West Ogden. This is 2470, less than a block 
away, had heard that person she knew, Tonya Stevens, had been murdered 
overnight. She went to her phone and on her caller I.D. saw that there had been a 
phone call made from her friend Tonya's house to her phone or the phone at 2470 
"B" Avenue at 11:23 P.M. the night before, the 19th of May. And her testimony 
would further be that she got on the telephone, called the Defendant and said, 
what's this all about. And he said, I made the telephone call." R. 281/54-55. 
There was a disagreement between the Defendant's attorney, Mr. Gravis and 
the prosecutor about whether that was the stipulation. They finally agreed that the 
stipulation was that Dorinda would testify that the Defendant said he made the 
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phone call. R. 281/55. The stipulation did not address Dorinda's identification of 
the hat. 
The prosecutor then questioned Detective Lucas about a conversation he had 
with a "Mrs. Ray." R. 281/56. Detective Lucas testified that "they [Dorinda and 
Mrs. Ray] told me that they had a picture with Edward Spinks wearing that hat that 
we had." Id. Detective Lucas further testified that they told him they didn't have 
the picture developed yet, so he drove them to Wal-Mart to get it developed. The 
picture was entered into evidence. R. 281/58. 
The proseuctor asked Detective Lucas if he showed Mrs. Ray the clothing 
that they found. Detective Lucas answered, "Yes. After the photograph, we then 
drove over to where the clothing was at the crime scene investigation unit and then 
showed her the levi pants and what she identified as being Edward Spinks, the 
underwear being Edward Spinks." Id. 
The prosecutor then stated "And she washed these?" To which Detective 
Lucas replied "Right. I asked her how she knew that. She said, I do his wash, so I 
recognize the clothing. The shirt she wasn't really sure of. She said, I couldn't tell 
you if the shirt is his or not." Id. Mrs. Ray did not testify during the trial. 
Later in the direct examination of Detective Lucas more hearsay from 
Dorinda Blankenship was introduced. Detective Lucas testified that "I had told 
Dorinda that if she had seen Edward Spinks to get hold of me. I gave her my pager 
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number and she paged me and I was at home and I called her." R. 281/68. 
Detective Lucas then testified that "she says, Edward Spinks is putting together a 
story. He's going to say that the clothes that you found which are his clothes, 
Nicky Bumpers was wearing them." Id. This hearsay was not objected to and 
other than the stipulation concerning the phone call, Dorinda did not testify. 
During the trial, the State called Elizabeth Stitt as a witness. After the 
prosecutor had her state her name he commented, "Elizabeth, you are scared to 
death to be here, right?" She replied, "a little nervous." R. 281/151. 
The State also called Detective Shane Minor to testify. During Detective 
Minor's testimony, the prosecutor said "Did you introduce yourself to him 
[Defendant]?" Detective Minor answered, "I identified myself. Asked Mr. Spinks 
if he'd remembered me." The prosecutor then stated, "well, and you had known 
him for some unrelated reason." Detective Minor said, "yes, from the past, and he 
acknowledged that." R. 283/101. 
Detectives Minor and Lucas both testified that the Defendant conferred to 
stabbing Tonya. Crime scent investigators found a finger print and a palm print in 
the victim's apartment. They identified both prints as the Defendant's. 
Following the jury deliberations, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as 
charged. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The defendant was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial because the 
prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct by referring to numerous matters 
which the jury wasn't justified in considering in determining their verdict. 
During the State's opening statement, the prosecutor referred to statements 
that witnesses had made which were extremely prejudicial to the Defendant. 
Several of these witnesses were not called to testify during the trial. The State also 
elicited hearsay statements through Detective Lucas. The statements consisted of 
the identification of the clothing with the victim's blood on it and the fact that the 
Defendant was putting a story together. Those witnesses did not testify during the 
trial. 
The prosecutor made other statements that constituted misconduct. He 
stated in front of the jury that defense counsel was misleading the jury. He also 
referred to the fact that one of the detectives who interviewed the Defendant had 
dealt with the Defendant on a prior occasion. Finally, during the closing argument, 
the prosecutor shifted the burden of proof on two separate occasions. The 
prosecutor's misconduct began during the opening statement and continued 
throughout the trial and into the rebuttal portion of the closing argument. 
Statements made by a prosecutor constitute misconduct when the statements 
"call to the attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in 
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determining its verdict and, if so, under the circumstances of the particular case, 
whether the error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result." 
State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
The Defendant's sixth amendment right to confront the witnesses against 
him was also violated. During Detective Lucas' direct testimony the hearsay 
statements of several witnesses were admitted into evidence. These witnesses did 
not testify and their hearsay statements were very prejudicial against the 
Defendant. 
The Defendant's sixth amendment right to effective of counsel was violated. 
The Defendant's attorney allowed inadmissible hearsay into evidence, he didn't 
ask for a mistrial after the prosecutor didn't present the evidence which he referred 
to during the opening statement. Defendant's attorney also didn't produce an 
effective defense, or call witnesses on the Defendant's behalf. 
Even if the errors by themselves were harmless, they were cumulatively 
harmful. The numerous errors denied the Defendant a fair trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT BY 
REFERRING TO MATTERS WHICH THE JURY WASN'T 
JUSTIFIED IN CONSIDERING IN DETERMING THEIR VERDICT. 
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Throughout the trial, the prosecutor made several statements which were 
improper. These statements amounted to prosecutorial misconduct because "the 
remarks call[ed] to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not be 
justified in considering in determining their verdict. . ." State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 
1239, 1261 (Utah 1988). Furthermore, these comments were extremely 
prejudicial. The statements which constitute prosecutorial misconduct are outlined 
below. 
A. The prosecutor made comments during the opening statement 
about evidence which was not presented during the trial. 
During the prosecutor's opening statement he referred to the statements of 
witnesses who did not testify at the trial. The statements he referred to were very 
prejudicial to the Defendant. The prosecutor told the jury that the detectives found 
some clothes that were with the victim's purse and which had the victim's blood 
on them. He then told the jury that a Daniel Moore told the detectives that the hat 
belonged to the Defendant. R. 280/116. Daniel Moore never testified during the 
trial. 
The prosecutor also told the jury that Leota Ray looked at the clothes and 
positively identified them as belonging to the Defendant. R. 280/117. Leota Ray 
did not testify during the trial. 
These statements amount to prosecutorial misconduct. In State v. Valdez, 
513 P.2d 422 (1973), the Utah Supreme Court established a test for determining 
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prosecutorial misconduct. "The test of whether the remarks made by counsel are so 
objectionable as to merit a reversal in a criminal case is, did the remarks call to the 
attention of the jurors matters which they would not be justified in considering in 
determining their verdict, and were they, under the circumstances of the particular 
case, probably influenced by those remarks." Id. at 426. 
In the case at bar, the first part of the test is met. "[D]id the remarks call to 
the attention of the jurors matters which they would not be justified in considering 
in determining their verdict. . ." Id. The prosecutor told the jury that both Daniel 
Moore and Leota Ray stated that the clothing was the Defendants. These 
individuals did not testify. Therefore, these remarks called to the attention of the 
jurors matters which they would not be justified in considering in determining their 
verdict. The second part of the test is whether "under the circumstances of the 
particular case, [the jury was] probably influenced by those remarks." Id. 
The statements of Daniel Moore and Leota Ray were extremely prejudicial 
to the Defendant and there is no way the jury could not be prejudiced by those 
remarks. There was clothing with the victim's blood on it and the victim's purse 
was found nearby. The prosecutor told the jury that two separate witnesses 
identified some of the clothing as the Defendant's. 
The Defendant does not need to show bad faith on the part of the prosecutor 
to show prosecutorial misconduct. "In Troy, we did not suggest that bad faith need 
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be shown. All that is necessary, according to Troy, is that 'the remarks call to the 
attention of the jurors matters which they would not be justified in considering in 
determining their verdict' and that the remarks rise to the level of prejudicial 
error." State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1261 (Utah 1988)(quoting State v. Troy, 
688 P.2d483, 486 (Utah 1984)). 
When deciding whether the second part of the test is met an appellate court 
should consider all of the evidence concerning a defendant's guilt. See, State v. 
Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984)("Step two is more difficult and involves a 
consideration of the circumstances of the case as a whole. In making such a 
consideration, it is appropriate to look at the evidence of defendant's guilt."). 
"If proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged conduct or remark 
will not be presumed prejudicial. Likewise, in a case with less compelling proof, 
this Court will more closely scrutinize the conduct." Id. (citations omitted). 
Without the statements from the witnesses identifying the bloody clothes as 
the Defendant's, the jury would have been left with evidence that the Defendant 
had been at the victim's apartment the night of the murder and an unrecorded 
confession. The murder weapon was never found and there was evidence that the 
pants, which were found with the victim's blood on them, were a size 40 and the 
underwear was size 42-44. R283/167. The Defendant is smaller than a size 40. 
Detective Lucas testified that the Defendant told him that he liked to wear his pants 
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baggy but he admitted that he didn't include this information in his report. See, R. 
281/83. 
B. The prosecutor stated that Defendant's attorney was 
misleading the jury. 
During Mr. Gravis' [Defendant's attorney] cross-examination of Joyce 
Nevarrez, the prosecutor stated in front of the jury that Mr. Gravis was misleading 
the jury. As Mr. Gravis questioned the witness concerning a discrepancy between 
her testimony and her statement to the police the prosecutor interrupted and stated, 
"Well, wait a minute. That's not what that question says in that example." R. 
282/45. Mr. Gravis objected to the prosecutor's interruption and the prosecutor 
stated, "That is a misrepresentation." R. 282/45. 
Mr. Gravis stated, "Mr. Daines can make an objection, but he can't argue in 
front of the jury." The judge agreed. R. 282/46. The prosecutor then stated in 
front of the jury a second time that Mr. Gravis was misleading the jury. R. 282/46. 
The judge incorrectly agreed with the prosecutor that Mr. Gravis was misleading 
the jury. Mr. Gravis was simply asking her about a statement she had made to 
police about the shoes the Defendant was wearing. Mr. Gravis asked for a mistrial 
which was denied. R. 282/50-51. 
It was misconduct for the prosecutor to attack the character of Defendant's 
attorney in front of the jury. The jury was excused and there was a discussion held 
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out of the presence of the jury. However, when the jury returned the judge did not 
correct the prosecutor's misconduct. 
In State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262 (Utah 1998), the prosecutor accused the 
defense attorney of misconduct in front of the jury. Id. at 275. In that case, the 
trial judge admonished the prosecutor and then gave a curative instruction to the 
jury. Id. The Supreme Court found that the Defendant in Harmon was not denied 
a fair trial. One of the factors the Court considered was that the trial court had 
given a curative instruction to the jury. Id. at 277. 
In the case at bar, the prosecutor was allowed to attack the character of 
defense counsel without a reprimand and without a curative instruction. The 
impression which was left with the jury was that Mr. Gravis was attempting to 
mislead them. 
The prosecutor's comments deprived the Defendant of his Constitutional 
right to a fair trial. Furthermore, the trial judge committed an abuse of discretion 
by agreeing that Mr. Gravis was misleading the jury and then not granting a 
mistrial. The prosecutor, as a representative of the State of Utah, unfairly 
prejudiced the Defendant when he impugned his attorney's integrity in front of the 
jury. This prejudice was substantial and prejudicial. If a jury is allowed to believe 
that the defendant's attorney is attempting to deliberately mislead them, they will 
hold that against the defendant. 
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In the case at bar, the trial judge should have either granted a mistrial or 
reprimanded the prosecutor in the presence of the jury and given a curative 
instruction. Since the trial judge did neither of these the Defendant's 
Constitutional right to a fair trial was violated. 
C. The prosecutor introduced improper character evidence. 
The prosecutor committed misconduct by referring to improper character 
evidence. When the State called Elizabeth Stitt to testify, the prosecutor asked her 
to state her name. After she stated her name, the prosecutor stated "Elizabeth, you 
are scared to death to be here, right?" R. 281/151. This statement by the 
prosecutor was clearly improper. It wasn't a question and it certainly wasn't 
relevant. Its only purpose was to prejudice the Defendant by showing that 
witnesses were afraid to testify against him. 
D. The prosecutor improperly introduced prior bad acts. 
The prosecutor referred to prior bad acts of the Defendant when he 
questioned Detective Shane Minor. The prosecutor asked Detective Minor, "Did 
you introduce yourself to him?" Detective Minor answered, "I identified myself. 
Asked Mr. Spinks if he'd remembered me." The prosecutor then stated, "Well, 
and you had known him for some unrelated reason." Detective Minor said, "yes, 
from the past, and he acknowledged that." R. 283/101. 
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This evidence was not relevant and clearly improper. Although the 
prosecutor didn't refer to a specific act, his intent was to show that the Defendant 
had been involved with the police in the past. The only inference the jury can draw 
from that exchange is that the Defendant has a criminal past and has a propensity 
to commit bad acts. 
In State v. Jones, 585 P.2d 445 (Utah 1978), the Court held that "evidence of 
other crimes is not admissible if the purpose is to disgrace the defendant as a 
person of evil character with a propensity to commit crime and thus likely to have 
committed the crime charged." Id. at 446(citations omitted). 
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that, "Evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order 
to show action in conformity therewith." In State v. Saunders, 992 P.2d 951 (Utah 
1999), the Utah Supreme Court stated; 
Anchoring the principle that prior crime evidence is not 
admissible to show criminal propensity is the more fundamental 
principle that a prosecutor may never argue or suggest to the finder of 
fact, either directly or indirectly, that a defendant should be convicted 
because of his criminal character or that he was guilty of the crime 
charged because he acted in accord with a criminal propensity shown 
by such evidence. This is true regardless of whether that evidence was 
properly or erroneously admitted. A prosecutor who intentionally calls 
to jurors' attention matters that they should not consider in reaching a 
verdict is clearly guilty of misconduct, particularly when a prosecutor 
argues prior bad acts or prior criminal conduct as a basis for 
convicting. Id. at 959. 
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The dialogue between the prosecutor and Detective Minor was clearly an 
attempt to call the jury's attention to the fact that the Defendant had a criminal 
propensity. The prosecutor called the jurors attention to the matter and it was a 
matter which the jury was not justified in considering. The prosecutor had already 
gone to great lengths to establish that this detective dealt with violent criminals. 
This detective had testified that he had been a police officer since 1980, but 
that since 1994 he had been on the Violent Crime Task Force which was sponsored 
by the FBI. R. 283/88-89. 
The prosecutor then established that Detective Minor was the commander of 
the Homicide Task Force. R. 283/89. 
The prosecutor also established that Detective Minor worked with Detective 
Lucas. Detective Minor testified that they worked together "off and on for 
probably 15 or 16 years. We didn't work together as partners, but we were 
assigned to the same division and worked off and on together." R. 283/90. 
This is significant because Detective Lucas had already testified that he had 
been in the detective division for the last twenty years, and he was assigned to 
major crimes. R. 281/4. "I investigate crimes against persons which is homicide, 
aggravated assault, aggravated robbery. Aggravated means there's a deadly 
weapon used. Aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape. Those are the types of 
crimes that I'm assigned to investigate." R. 281/4. The jury could only reach one 
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conclusion from this statement. The Defendant, at some time in the past, had been 
involved in a violent crime. 
Although the Defendant's attorney didn't object to the evidence it was 
clearly plain error for this evidence to be admitted. A defendant must show the 
following to establish plain error, "(i) An error exists; (ii) the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court; (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there 
is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant. . ." State 
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
E. The prosecutor shifted the burden of proof during the closing 
argument. 
During the State's rebuttal portion of the closing argument, the prosecutor, 
on two different occasions, attempted to shift the burden of proof to the Defendant. 
The prosecutor stated, "if these prints were computerized and dummied up, he 
either did it or supervised it. Did you think you saw a person who would dummy 
up some prints? But there's no evidence. If they want to prove that you can 
dummy up prints—because Russ didn't know—" R. 283/228. At this point, the 
Defendant's attorney objected. The trial judge said he didn't understand and the 
prosecutor interrupted the judge and said "what he's saying, your honor, is that 
they - 1 can't say that, that they could have brought somebody in for the purpose of 
saying this could be done because Russ didn't say it could be done." R. 283/228. 
The judge stated that he thought the objection was valid. R. 283/228. 
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The prosecutor continued with his closing argument. A short time later the 
prosecutor shifted the burden by stating, "Now, all of a sudden they've unearthed 
Sheldon Reeves as a reasonable likely - of a person who might have done this. 
First of all, they've offered no explanation as to how he managed to do any of the 
things that the Defendant said he did." R. 283/230-31. Mr. Gravis objected and 
the judge sustained the objection. R. 283/231. 
After the objection was sustained, the prosecutor said, "this isn't just a 
matter of a person- he happened to walk by and, yeah, he was a friend of 
Tonya's. What's his motive? He's her friend. Why is he gonna kill her? There's 
no evidence for that. Yet they just raise a man who happens to walk by at that 
time." R. 283/231. 
The Defendant's due process rights were violated when the prosecutor made 
these statements. "[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against 
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 
90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073 (1970). In State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that "[a] fundamental precept of our criminal law is that the 
State must prove all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id at 92. 
Once a defendant raises an affirmative defense the State bears the burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not exist. "Utah has 
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unambiguously adopted the position that 'a defendant does not bear the burden of 
persuasion in presenting an affirmative defense.'" State v. Tebbs, 786 P.2d 775, 
779 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In Starks, the Court held that "[t]he prosecutor's burden 
. . . is to prove all elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, 
whether the defense is a denial or an affirmative defense." 
In State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), this Court held "[t]he 
burden remains on the state throughout the trial to prove each element of the 
charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. At no point does any segment of that 
burden shift to the defendant." Id. at 934. Even if the defense raises the defense, 
the prosecutor still has the burden to refute the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
"Once the defendant raises an affirmative defense, supported by some evidence -
whether introduced by defense or prosecution - the State must refute the defense 
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. 
By shifting the burden of proof during the closing argument, the prosecutor 
committed prosecutorial misconduct by calling the jurors attention to matters 
which they were not justified in considering. 
F. The prosecutor told the jury the judge didn't want them to 
consider evidence. 
The prosecutor also committed misconduct when he told the jurors that the 
judge didn't want them to consider a defense the Defendant had presented. The 
prosecutor referred the jury to instruction 26 which was the reasonable doubt 
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instruction. The prosecutor commented on the palm print which was found on the 
bed rail in the victim's apartment. The print was photographed soon after the 
homicide but it wasn't analyzed until over nine months later. By that time, the 
actual print had flaked off the bed rail. See, R. 282/97. The picture of the print 
was put on a computer and then compared to the Defendant's known prints. R. 
282/97. 
During defense counsel's closing argument he attacked that evidence. See, 
R. 283/222. In the prosecutor's rebuttal argument, he stated " But if you'll 
remember the testimony up here, he brought up whether a computerized thing 
could be done, and Russ said, I don't know, maybe. I don't know. Read Rule 26, 
the reasonable doubt statute. He says, who knows. Anything's possible with 
Jurassic Park. That is exactly what Judge Taylor doesn't want you considering 
when he says, by reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason . . ." R. 283/229. 
The Defendant's due process rights were violated when the prosecutor told 
the jury that the judge didn't want them to consider an issue that the Defendant had 
raised. The judge must be neutral and detached as he or she presides over a trial. 
The prosecutor told the jury that "this is exactly what Judge Taylor doesn't want 
you considering . . ." R. 283/229. The statement was improper and gave the jury 
the impression that the Judge had a stake in the outcome. The statement also gave 
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the jury the false impression that they could not consider a defense which the 
Defendant presented. 
All of the statements outlined above were improper because they referred to 
matters which the jury wasn't justified in considering in determining their verdict. 
These instances of misconduct prejudiced the Defendant and his right to a fair trial 
was violated. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO 
CONFRONT WITNESSES WAS VIOLATED WHEN 
HEARSAY EVIDENCE WAS ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE 
THROUGH DETECTIVE LUCAS. 
The right of an accused to confront witnesses against him is a fundamental 
right guaranteed by both the federal and state constitutions. See, State v. 
Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 479 (Utah 1990). The Defendant's constitutional right to 
confront witnesses was violated when the trial court allowed hearsay evidence on 
several important issues. 
When the State called Detective Lucas to the stand, they introduced 
numerous hearsay statements under the guise that they were explaining why 
Detective Lucas took particular actions. The State first introduced the hearsay 
statements of Elizabeth Stitt. The prosecutor asked Detective Lucas, "Did you 
confirm with her that she had made that phone call?" Detective Lucas answered, 
"Yes." R. 281/15. At this point, defense counsel interrupted and stated, "Your 
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honor, for the record, I would agree with Mr. Daines that this is hearsay. It's not 
being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, simply to explain what Officer 
Lucas did and why he did it." R. 281/15. 
The prosecutor then said, "That's correct, your honor. And so the Court and 
the jury knows, I have told Mr. Gravis because of the fact that this case actually 
started four days later than it was originally set, we lost some witnesses until later 
in the week. And so we've had to rearrange witnesses. Because of that, I will go 
back and cover some of these things. Mr. Gravis agrees that it can be offered not 
for the truth of the matter asserted. If we assert it for the truth of the matter 
asserted, we must prove it by the more original means in the future, and I would 
proffer that we will do that." R. 281/15-16. 
The trial judge then explained to the jury that the evidence was only coming 
in to show what Detective Lucas knew when he was questioning other people. The 
trial judge also stated, "you can't use it to prove what she did. We're going to have 
to have her take the stand and testify about when she called in. You can only use it 
to show that Detective Lucas knew that a call had been received at that time." R. 
281/16. 
The prosecutor then elicited the hearsay statements of several people even 
though none of them had anything to do with why Detective Lucas took the actions 
that he did. For instance, the prosecutor asked the detective what he learned from 
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Nancy Palacios. R. 281/19. Detective Lucas answered that she had seen a black 
male outside of Tonya's apartment smoking a cigarette. R. 281/20. This evidence 
wasn't used to show why Detective Lucas acted in a certain way. It served no 
purpose at this point other than to have the professional witness first tell the jury 
what the witness had said. 
A short time later, Detective Lucas testified that he went and talked to 
Sheldon Reeves. Officers had found Mr. Reeves walking through the parking lot 
without a shirt on. Detective Lucas testified that Mr. Reeves said he had been 
fishing. R. 281/31. 
The most damning hearsay was the identification of the clothes which were 
found with the victim's blood on them. The prosecutor asked Detective Lucas if 
he identified the owner of the hat. R. 281/47. Detective Lucas answered yes, and 
the prosecutor then asked him to describe for the jury how this happened. 
Detective Lucas stated, "when the hat came out, we showed the hat to Dorinda and 
asked her, do you have any idea who's hat this is. And there was a boy there. I 
think his name is Daniel now as I recall. And he says, yeah. That looks like 
somebody I know. And I says, well, whose is it? And he says. I think that's 
Damian Moore's hat. And Dorinda says, no. No. That's not it. That's not 
Damian's. And they both realized, oh, this is Edward Spinks' hat." R. 281/47. 
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The State did not call Daniel to testify even though they listed him as a 
witness at the beginning of the trial. See, R. 280/9. The State did not call Dorinda 
to testify. The prosecutors also listed Dorinda as a witness. See, R. 280/9. There 
was a stipulation entered that Dorinda would testify that the Defendant had told her 
that he made a phone call from the victim's apartment. See, R. 281/54-55. 
However, the stipulation did not cover her identification of the hat. 
The State then introduced the hearsay of Melissa Padilla. Melissa was listed 
by the State as a witness but was not called to testify. See, R. 280/9. Detective 
Lucas testified that Melissa told him that the Defendant had made a phone call 
from the victim's house and that she had learned that from speaking to Dorinda 
Blankenship. R. 281/53-54. This evidence was hearsay on hearsay. 
The next hearsay which was introduced was that of Loeta Ray. The 
prosecutor said to Detective Lucas, "did you show Mrs. Ray the clothing that you 
had found the previous night?" R. 281/58. Detective Lucas answered, "yes. After 
the photograph, we then drove over to where the clothing was at the crime scene 
investigative unit and then showed her the levi pants and what she identified as 
being Edward Spinks, the underwear being Edward Spinks." R. 281/58. 
The prosecutor then stated "And she said she washed these?" R. 281/58. 
Detective Lucas answered, "right. I asked her how she knew that. She said, I do 
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his wash, so I recognize the clothing. The shirt she wasn't really sure of. She said, 
I couldn't tell you if the shirt is his or not." R. 281/58. 
Mrs. Ray did not testify during the trial. She was also listed as one of the 
State's witnesses at the beginning of the trial. R. 280/9. The State did offer an 
explanation as to why they didn't call her to testify. On the final day of trial, the 
prosecutor explained why he wasn't going to have Mrs. Ray testify. This 
happened outside of the presence of the jury. The prosecutor indicated that she had 
changed what she was going to say and also that she was very upset and that she 
vomited. See, R. 283/3-8. 
Later on in the direct examination of Detective Lucas, more hearsay from 
Dorinda Blankenship was introduced. Detective Lucas testified that "I had told 
Dorinda that if she had seen Edward Spinks to get hold of me. I gave her my pager 
number and she paged me and I was at home and I called her." R. 281/68. 
Detective Lucas then testified that "she says, Edward Spinks is putting together a 
story. He's going to say that the clothes that you found which are his clothes, 
Nicky Bumpers was wearing them." Id. This hearsay was not objected to and 
other than the stipulation concerning the phone call, Dorinda did not testify. 
The State did introduce into evidence a picture of the Defendant wearing a 
North Carolina baseball hat, which was the same type of hat that was found with 
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the clothes and purse. However, the foundation for this picture and the subsequent 
weight which this picture carried was all based on hearsay. 
Detective Lucas testified that Mrs. Ray and Dorinda, "had told me that they 
had a picture with Edward Spinks wearing the hat that we had." R. 281/56. 
The hearsay that was admitted into evidence was extremely prejudicial to the 
Defendant. By allowing the hearsay into evidence the Defendant was denied his 
constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. Even though the 
prosecutor made the statement that the hearsay wasn't for the truth of the matter 
asserted it served no other legitimate purpose. The prosecutor also indicated that 
they would prove those statements by other means which the State never did. 
Therefore, the jury was left with the statements from three different witnesses who 
did not testify, that the clothes and hat were the Defendants. They also had the 
hearsay statement that the Defendant was putting a story together and that he was 
going to say the Nicky Bumpers was wearing the clothes. In State v. Webb, 779 
P.2d 1108 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court stated that "if the declarant is not 
present, the core values of the confrontation right are implicated because the 
essence of the confrontation right is the opportunity to have the accusing witness in 
court and subject to cross-examination, so that bias and credibility can be evaluated 
by the finder of fact." Id. at 1112. 
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The Defendant did not have the opportunity to cross-examine these 
important witnesses against him. The jury heard their statements during the State's 
opening statement and again through Detective Lucas, but they did not get the 
opportunity to evaluate the witnesses' bias or credibility. 
In State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court 
held that "[i]f the evidence violates a defendant's right to confront witnesses, it 
should not be admitted." Id. at 480. The Court then adopted a two-part test to 
evaluate the extent of a violation of the right to confrontation. Id. "First, we look 
at whether the State's presentation of hearsay testimony of extrajudicial statements 
or occurrences is 'crucial to the state's case or 'devastating' to the defendant." Id. 
In the case at bar, the hearsay testimony was clearing devastating to the 
Defendant. There were three separate witnesses who allegedly identified clothing 
with the victim's blood on it as belonging to the Defendant. There was also a 
statement that the Defendant was putting a story together. 
Since the hearsay testimony was devastating to the Defendant the first part 
of the hearsay test is met. The second part of the test is "[sjecond, we look at the 
availability of the declarant and whether the presence of the declarant will add any 
probative value to the evidence by allowing the trier of fact to observe the 
demeanor of the witness." Id. 
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When the State was asked by the trial judge to tell the jury who its witnesses 
were the State listed all of the witnesses whose hearsay statements were admitted. 
Leota Ray showed up to testify, but the prosecutor decided not to call her as a 
witness because she was upset and he didn't like what she was going to say. In 
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 1000, S.Ct. 2531 (1980), the Supreme Court 
articulated a two part test for determining the admissibility of hearsay when a 
hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial. First, there must be 
a showing of 'unavailability.' Second, if the declarant is unavailable, the statement 
at issue is admissible only if it bears adequate indicia of reliability. Id. at 66, 1000 
S.Ct. at 2539 (1980). 
The Utah Supreme Court held in State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 
1994), "that constitutional unavailability is found only when it is 'practically 
impossible to produce the witness in court.'" Id. at 402 (quoting, State v. Webb, 
779P.2dat 1113). 
The Utah Supreme Court also stated in Menzies, that "unavailability will not 
be found merely because the witness would be uncomfortable on the stand or . . . 
testifying would be stressful. In short, every reasonable effort must be made to 
produce the witness" Id. (citations and quotations omitted). 
In the case at bar, Leota Ray was present at the courthouse. The prosecutor 
chose to have her not testify even though he had already told the jury what she 
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would say during his opening statement, and he had introduced her statements 
through Detective Lucas. 
The Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial was violated when he 
was not given the opportunity to confront several of the witnesses against him. 
The Defendant's attorney did not object to the hearsay so this violation should be 
reviewed under a plain error standard of review. At the time the hearsay was 
allowed into evidence the prosecutor had given defense counsel the assurance that 
he would "go back and cover some of these things" and that these statements 
would be proven by "the more original means . . ." R. 281/16. 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF 
THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, 
SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION WHEN HIS ATTORNEYS FAILED TO 
OBJECT TO HEARSAY AND IMPROPER CHARACTER 
EVIDENCE, WHEN THEY FAILED TO ASK FOR A 
MISTRIAL WHEN THE PROSECUTOR DIDN'T PRODUCE 
ALL OF THE EVIDENCE WHICH HE REFERRED TO IN HIS 
OPENING STATEMENT, AND WHEN HIS ATTORNEYS 
FAILED TO PRESENT AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to counsel is 
the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 686, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692 (1984). In Strickland, the Supreme Court 
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established a two-part test to determine whether counsel's assistance was 
ineffective. "First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel 
was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. 
Defense counsel's errors throughout the trial were numerous. First they 
allowed the State to introduce the hearsay statements of several witnesses. Then 
he didn't ask for a mistrial when those witnesses didn't testify and when the 
prosecutor had already referred to their statements. 
Second, the prosecutor made several inappropriate statements throughout the 
trial which were not objected to. Those statements are addressed under Point I of 
this brief. The final and most prejudicial failure of defense counsel was in failing 
to establish a defense for the Defendant. The Defendant was charged with a first 
degree felony. The Defendant's attorney called only one witness. He recalled 
Detective Lucas to establish that the underwear was a size extra-large, 42-44. This 
defense consists of three pages of direct testimony in the transcript and one page of 
redirect examination. The Defense didn't produce Sheldon Reeves who was found 
in the victim's parking lot without a shirt on shortly after the murder. Sheldon 
Reeves is also much larger than the Defendant. See, R. 283/ 224. 
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The second prong of the two-part test articulated in Strickland is "the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant 
of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 
687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. 
In Strickland, the Court held that "[t]he purpose of the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to 
justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding." In State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 
182 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court held that to meet the second part of the 
Strickland test a defendant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." Id. at 187(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.' 
668, 694 (1984)). In making the determination that counsel was ineffective the 
appellate court should "consider the totality of the evidence, taking into account 
such factors as whether the errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an 
isolated effect and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record." Id. 
When the totality of the circumstances is considered it is clear that the 
Defendant did not receive the type of assistance necessary to justify confidence in 
the outcome of the trial. 
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POINT IV 
THE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A 
FAIR TRIAL WAS VIOLATED BECAUSE OF THE 
NUMEROUS ERRORS THAT OCCURRED DURING HIS 
TRIAL. 
Even if all of the errors were individually harmless, they were cumulatively 
harmful. Under the cumulative error doctrine this Court should reverse the 
Defendant's conviction. "Under the cumulative error doctrine, we will reverse 
only if the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our confidence . . . 
that a fair trial was had." State v. Colwell, 994 P.2d 177, 186 (Utah 2000). 
The errors in the Defendant's trial were numerous. They started during the 
State's opening statement and continued until the rebuttal portion of the State's 
closing argument. They have been outlined and briefed above. The prosecutor 
referred to evidence during the opening statement which was not presented during 
the trial. Numerous hearsay statements were elicited through Detective Lucas. 
The comments during the opening statement and the hearsay were very prejudicial 
against the Defendant. The prosecutor stated that the Defendant's attorney was 
misleading the jury. The prosecutor indicated that Detective Minor had dealt with 
the Defendant before. The prosecutor shifted the burden during his closing 
argument. The Defendant's attorney did not provide an effective defense. The 
result of these many errors was that the Defendant did not receive a fair trial. For 
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this reason, the conviction should be reversed and the Defendant should be granted 
a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial was repeatedly violated 
through out the trial. The prosecutor continually referred to matters which were 
improper and which the jury wasn't justified in considering in determining its 
verdict. Furthermore, these statements were extremely prejudicial to the 
Defendant. These improper statements began with the prosecutor referring to 
evidence which he didn't produce during the trial and they ended during the 
closing argument when the prosecutor shifted the burden to the Defendant. 
The Defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses was also violated. 
The State introduced prejudicial evidence against the Defendant through hearsay. 
These hearsay statements identified the Defendant's clothing and told the jury that 
the Defendant was putting together a story. The Defendant did not get to cross-
examine these witnesses and the jury didn't get to evaluate the witnesses' bias or 
credibility. 
The Defendant's attorney was ineffective. He allowed the State to introduce 
inadmissible evidence without objecting and without asking for curative 
instructions. Defense counsel also failed to present an effective or complete 
defense. 
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Finally, if the errors were individually harmless, the cumulative effect of the 
many errors was that the Defendant was denied his constitutional right to a fair 
trial. For these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
his conviction and remand his case back to the trial court so he can receive a fair 
trial. 
DATED this jjjclay of October, 2002. 
DEE W. SMITH 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Karen Klucznik, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 160 East 
300 South, 6th Floor PO Box 140854 SLC, Utah 84114-0180, postage prepaid 
this/j±kday of September, 2002. 
DEE W. SMITH 
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Date of birth: April 15, 1969 
Video 
CHARGES 
1. MURDER - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 08/13/2001 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of MURDER a 1st Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less 
than five years and which may be life in the Utah State Prison. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
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Case No: 001902033 
Date: Oct 05, 2001 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The prison sentence imposed in this case is to run consecutively to 
the prison sentence the defendant is now serving. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
The Court recommends credit for time served from May 20, 2000 to 
September 8, 2000. 
The defendant shall pay restitution in the amount of $8,000 for 
funeral expenses. Restitution is to be left open for a period of 
five years to include any psychological expenses incurred by the 
victim's family. 
Dated this !$ day of _J^CJ__ 
STMTOft M. T, 
D i s t r i c t Co 




























OF YOU WHO ARE BASKETBALL FANS, LIGHT BLUE CAROLINA 
BASKETBALL HAT, IT SAYS CAROLINA ACROSS THE FRONT, LIGHT 
POWDER BLUE NORTH — UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA BASKETBALL 
HAT, ALSO OSTENSIBLY HAVING BLOOD ON IT. 
THEY CONTINUE TO SEARCH UNDER THIS TRUCK. UNDER THE 
WHEEL WELL ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THIS TRUCK THEY FOUND A 
PURSE. THEY FOUND — AND THEY FOUND A SMALL BOTTLE OF 
WHISKEY WINDSOR WHISKEY. IT'S NOT A FULL FIFTH, IT'S JUST A 
SMALLER BOTTLE. THEY OPENED THE PURSE, THEY PULLED OUT A 
UTAH I.D. CARD AND THERE WAS A PICTURE OF TONYA STEVENS IN 
THE PURSE. ALSO IN THE PURSE WAS A SPRAY BOTTLE OF RAVE 
HAIRSPRAY. 
PEOPLE WHO LIVED IN THE HOUSE CAME OUT. AT FIRST DORINDA 
THOUGHT THE HAT BELONGED TO HER SON WHO WAS THE BOY, DANIEL 
MOORE, WHO WAS ON THE STEPS WHO SAID GO AHEAD YOU CAN GO BACK 
THERE. MOORE CAME OUT AND LOCKED AT THE HAT AND SAID, THAT'S 
NOT MY HAT, IT IS EDWARD SPINKS' HAT. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN 
THE INVESTIGATION WE'RE NOW ABOUT 7:45 OR 8 P.M. IN THE 
EVENING ON THE 20TH OF MAY, THE NAME EDWARD SPINKS BECOMES 
KNOWN TO THE DEFENSE — OR I MEAN, TO THE DETECTIVES WHO ARE 
THERE. THE BLOOD ON THE PANTS ON THE LEVI'S THAT WERE FOUND 
UNDER THERE, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY, BY D.N.A. 
INDICATE WITH THE HUGE PROBABILITIES THAT D.N.A. CARRIES WITH 



























SUNDAY, MAY 21ST, LUCAS IS STILL OUT — HE'S COME RIGHT 
BACK OUT THE NEXT MORNING, THEY HAVEN'T SOLVED THIS CASE YET, 
THEY ARE LOOKING AROUND, THEY ARE TRYING TO FIND OUT WHAT'S 
GOING ON. DORINDA BLANKENSHIP WHO LIVES IN THAT HOUSE TELLS 
LUCAS, I FOUND A CALLER I.D. — AND HE'S TIPPED OFF THIS BY 
THE WOMAN WHO LIVED OVER IN THE APARTMENTS. DORINDA SAYS TO 
LUCAS, I FOUND THE CALLER I.D. — NOW, REMEMBER, THIS IS 
SUNDAY MORNING, IT'S SOME TIME IN THE MORNING IN WEST OGDEN, 
EVERYBODY OBVIOUSLY IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD NOW KNOWS TONYA 
STEVENS WHO MANY OF THEM KNOW HAS BEEN MURDERED THE NIGHT 
BEFORE. SHE SAID, LUCAS, I FOUND ON MY CALLER I.D. WHEN I 
WOKE UP THIS MOPNING TONYA'S NUMBER, IT SAID THAT TONYA HAD 
CALLED MY PHONE OR THE PHONE IN MY HOUSE AT 11:23 LAST NIGHT 
AND I'VE TALKED TO SPINKS AND HE TOLD ME HE'S THE ONE THAT 
MAnFTKf_ CALL. 
SO NOW LUCAS KNOWS AT 11:23 P.M. THIS DEFENDANT WAS IN 
TONYA STEVENS'S APARTMENT OR USING TONYA STEVENS'S PHONE. 
LATER THAT DAY MRS. LEOTA RAY IN WHOSE HOME THE DEFENDANT 
LIVES SOME OF THE TIME, TOOK A LOOK AT THE CLOTHING; PANTS, 
DEFINITELY SPINKS; HAT, UNQUESTIONABLY SPINKS; UNDERWEAR, I 
WASH IT ALL THE TIME; SPINKS SHIRT, I'M NOT SO SURE OF, COULD 
BE, I'M JUST NOT CERTAIN ABOUT THE SHIRT. SO HE HAS AN 
IDENTIFICATION OF THE CLOTHES AS BELONGING TO THE DEFENDANT. 
THE DEFENDANT IN THE MEANTIME AFTER HAVING SPENT THE 


























TO THE DETECTIVE DIVISION. 
Q. HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN A POLICE OFFICER? 
A. TWENTY-FOUR YEARS. 
Q. HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN ASSIGNED TO THE DETECTIVE 
DIVISION? 
A. TWENTY YEARS. 
Q. IS THE DETECTIVE DIVISION DIVIDED INTO PARTS? 
A. YES. YOU HAVE FORGERY, AUTO THEFT, MAJOR CRIME. THAT'S 
THE DIVISION I'M ASSIGNED TO, MAJOR CRIME. I INVESTIGATE 
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS WHICH IS HOMICIDE, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY. AGGRAVATED MEANS THERE'S A DEADLY WEAPON 
USED. AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, AGGRAVATED RAPE. THOSE ARE THE 
TYPES OF CRIMES THAT I'M ASSIGNED TO INVESTIGATE. 
Q. HOW MANY YEARS HAVE YOU BEEN DOING THIS? 
A. TWENTY YEARS. 
Q. OKAY. AND SO ON THE -- IN ADDITION TO THIS JOB, CALLING 
YOUR ATTENTION TO THE 20TK OF MAY OR THE 19TH OF MAY, RIGHT 
NOW, 2000, IN ADDITION TO WHAT YOU HAVE DESCRIBED AS YOUR 
POSITIONS WITH THE JURY, DID YOU HAVE ANOTHER POSITION ON THAT 
DAY AS IT PERTAINS TO HOMICIDE INVESTIGATION IN PARTICULAR? 
A. YES. I'M A MEMBER OF THE HOMICIDE TASK FORCE. 
Q. WOULD YOU TELL THE JURY WHAT THAT IS, PLEASE? 
A. WHAT THIS IS, IS IT'S A 20 INVESTIGATORS MADE UP OF 
INVESTIGATORS FROM ALL THE JURISDICTIONS IN WEBER COUNTY. AND 
WE ACTUALLY HAVE TWO TEAMS MADE UP OF TEN EACH, AND DEPENDING 
1 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. DAINES: 
3 Q. STATE YOUR NAME AND OCCUPATION PLEASE. 
4 A. SHANE MINOR. I'M CURRENTLY AN INVESTIGATOR WITH THE 
5 WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE. 
6 Q. CALLING YOUR ATTENTION TO THE 20TH OF MAY, 2000, WHAT 
7 WAS YOUR JOB AT THAT TIME? 
8 A. I WAS EMPLOYED WITH THE OGDEN CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT AND 
9 WAS ASSIGNED TO A VIOLENT CRIME TASK FORCE. 
10 Q. HOW LONG HAD YOU BEEN A POLICE OFFICER WITH THE OGDEN 
11 CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT? 
12 A. SINCE FEBRUARY OF 1980. 
13 Q. AND SO THE JURY IS CLEAR ON THIS, YOU ACTUALLY HAVE 
14 RETIRED FROM THE OGDEN POLICE DEPARTMENT AT THIS TIME. 
15 A. YES, ABOUT A YEAR AGO WHEN I WENT TO WORK AT THE COUNTY 
16 ATTORNEY'S OFFICE. 
17 Q. AND YOU'RE ONE OF THE INVESTIGATORS NOW AT THE COUNTY 
18 ATTORNEY'S OFFICE. 
19 A. YES. 
20 Q. AT THIS TIME, WERE YOU -- YOU SAY YOU WERE WITH OGDEN 
21 POLICE DEPARTMENT. ON THE 20TH OF MAY, WERE YOU ASSIGNED 
22 SOMEWHERE ELSE AT THAT TIME? 
23 A. YES, I WAS ASSIGNED — I WAS EMPLOYED WITH THE OGDEN 
24 CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, BUT BACK IN 1994, THEY FORMED A 
25 VIOLENT CRIME TASK FORCE. IT WAS SPONSORED BY THE F.B.I. I 
1 WAS ASSIGNED TO THAT I BELIEVE AROUND AUGUST OF '94, AND MAY 
2 OF LAST YEAR, THAT WAS STILL MY CURRENT ASSIGNMENT WORKING. 
3 Q. WHEN YOU RETIRED. 
4 A. YES. 
5 Q. IS THAT CORRECT? 
6 A. YES. 
7 Q. AND SO YOU SPENT SOME SIX OR — SIX YEAR YEARS WITH 
8 THE — IN F.B.I.-TRAINED PROJECTS. 
9 A. WORKING VIOLENT CRIME WITH THE F.B.I., WE WORKED OUT OF 
10 THE F.B.I. OFFICE AND UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF THEIR GUIDELINES. 
11 Q. I GUESS THERE'S SOME QUESTION WHO WAS TRAINING WHOM AT 
12 THE TIME, THOUGH. 
13 A. SOMETIMES. 
14 Q. NOW, IN ADDITION TO EVERYTHING WE'VE TALKED ABOUT, ARE 
15 YOU PRESENTLY — DO YOU PRESENTLY HAVE A POSITION WITH THE 
16 HOMICIDE TASK FORCE HERE IN WEBER COUNTY THAT, SO YOU KNOW, 
17 THE JURY'S PREVIOUSLY HEARD ABOUT? 
18 A. YES. TO GIVE YOU A LITTLE BACKGROUND, IN 1998 I BELIEVE 
19 THEY FORMED A HOMICIDE — IT'S CALLED HOMICIDE TASK FORCE, A 
20 MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL TASK FORCE MADE UP OF DIFFERENT 
21 JURISDICTIONS IN THIS COUNTY. I WAS PART OF THAT WHEN IT WAS 
22 FORMED, A TEAM LEADER OVER ONE OF THE TEAMS. THERE WAS TWO 
23 TEAMS. AND I AM CURRENTLY THE COMMANDER OVER THAT. 
24 Q. THEY'VE HEARD THE WORD LIEUTENANT DOUG COLEMAN OF THE 
25 SHERIFF'S OFFICE, ALTHOUGH THEY'VE NEVER MET HIM. YOU HAVE 
1 SUCCEEDED HIM, IS THAT CORRECT? 
2 A. YES, HE WAS THE COMMANDER PREVIOUSLY. 
3 Q. NOW, ON THIS DAY, THE 20TH OF MAY, 2000, YOU WERE A TEAM 
4 LEADER, I BELIEVE YOU SAY — YOU SAID? 
5 A. YES. 
6 Q. OR YOU SAID. WAS YOUR TEAM CALLED OUT FOR THIS MURDER? 
7 A. NOT ON THIS CASE, NO. 
8 Q. OKAY. AND SO YOU WERE NOT CALLED OUT ON THE 20TH OF 
9 MAY, 2000? 
10 A. I WAS CALLED ON THE — I WAS CALLED ON THE 20TH — 
11 Q. CALLED OUT AS A TEAM LEADER, I SHOULD BE MORE SPECIFIC. 
12 A. BUT OUR SQUAD WASN'T CALLED OUT. WE WOULD ROTATE 
13 BETWEEN THE OTHER — OTHER TEAM SQUAD AND -- AND MINE. 
14 Q. DID YOU NEVERTHELESS GET A TELEPHONE CALL ON THE 20TH OF 
15 MAY TO ASSIST IN THIS HOMICIDE? 
16 A. I GOT A PAGE FROM DETECTIVE LUCAS. 
17 Q. NOW, YOU AND DAVE HAVE WORKED TOGETHER FOR HOW MANY 
18 YEARS? 
19 A. OFF AND ON FOR PROBABLY 15 OR 16 YEARS. WE DIDN'T WORK 
20 TOGETHER AS PARTNERS, BUT WE WERE ASSIGNED TO SAME DIVISION 
21 AND WORKED OFF AND ON TOGETHER. 
22 Q. BOTH — AND THIS DIVISION IS THE DIVISION THAT WORKS 
23 MURDERS — 
24 A. YES. 
25 Q. — FOR OGDEN CITY, IS THAT CORRECT? 
1 THINK, I BELIEVE, HAD MADE A CALL FROM THAT HOUSE. 
2 Q. ALL RIGHT. NOW, HAVE YOU STILL EVER REALLY BEEN TOLD 
3 WHERE TONYA WAS IN THAT APARTMENT TO THE BEST OF YOUR 
4 RECOLLECTION AT THE PRESENT TIME? 
5 A. I THINK I MIGHT HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT SHE WAS BACK IN A 
6 BEDROOM AREA. 
7 Q. OKAY. 
8 A. BUT THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN IT. I NEVER SEEN THE INSIDE OF 
9 THE BUILDING. 
10 Q. ALL RIGHT. SO THAT WHAT TIME OF DAY DID YOU GO IN — 
11 DID YOU GO IN TO SPEAK TO THE DEFENDANT? 
12 A. IT WAS ABOUT 12:05, JUST AFTER TWELVE NOON. 
13 Q. ALL RIGHT. AND LUCAS WAS WITH YOU. 
14 A. YES. 
15 Q. DID YOU INTRODUCE YOURSELF TO HIM? 
16 A. I IDENTIFIED MYSELF. ASKED MR. SPINKS IF HE'D 
17 REMEMBERED ME. 
18 Q. WELL, AND YOU HAD KNOWN HIM FOR SOME UNRELATED REASON. 
19 A. YES, FROM THE PAST, AND HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT. 
20 Q. YEAH, THIS HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH WHAT WE'RE TALKING 
21 ABOUT HERE? 
22 A. NO, JUST AN INTRODUCTION. 
23 Q. OKAY. AFTER YOU — WAS IT A PLEASANT INTRODUCTION THAT 
24 YOU HAD WITH HIM? 
25 A. YEAH, JUST ASKED HIM IF HE REMEMBERED ME, AND HE 
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ACKNOWLEDGED HE DID. 
Q. OKAY. AND THEN DID YOU HAVE A CONVERSATION WITH HIM? 
A. YES, I DID. 
Q. NOW, WHAT — DID YOU VIDEO OR AUDIO TAPE THIS 
CONVERSATION? 
A. NO, I DID NOT. 
Q. EXPLAIN TO THE JURY WHY YOU DIDN'T. 
A. I'VE NEVER VIDEOTAPED AND AUDIO TAPED MY INTERVIEWS. 
Q. WHY NOT, TELL THE JURY. 
A. IN MY EXPERIENCE, PEOPLE HAVE A TENDENCY TO CLAM UP AND 
THEY DON'T WANNA TALK TO YOU IF THEY KNOW THEY'RE BEING 
VIDEOTAPED OR IF YOU PUT A CASSETTE RECORDER IN FRONT OF 
THEM. AND I'VE HAD — I TRIED IT A COUPLE TIMES AND I JUST 
HAD BAD EXPERIENCES WITH IT, WITH PEOPLE WANTING TO TALK. SO 
I'VE ALWAYS INTERVIEWED THE PEOPLE AND THEN AS SOON AS WE GET 
DONE INTERVIEWING 'EM, WE SIT DOWN AND WE GO THROUGH WHAT'S 
CALLED A FORMAL WRITTEN STATEMENT. 
Q. NOW, YOU MIGHT DO IT IN WRITING, YOU MIGHT DO IT BY 
VIDEO OR YOU MIGHT DO IT BY AUDIO OR WHATEVER, BUT YOU 
DON'T — YOU DON'T EVER TALK TO THEM INITIALLY THAT WAY. 
A. NO. AND I'VE ALWAYS DONE IT BY WRITING, A TYPED OUT 
WRITTEN STATEMENT EXACTLY WHAT THEY'VE SAID AND THEY READ 
THROUGH IT AND MAKE SURE EVERYTHING'S CORRECT. IF THERE'S 
ANYTHING THAT NEEDS TO BE CHANGED, WE ASK THAT THEY MAKE THE 




























Q. AT THAT TIME DID YOU SPEAK TO HER BRIEFLY? 
A. YES. 
Q. NOW, I'LL JUMP AHEAD, AND THEN IF YOU WANT TO OBJECT, 
FINE. BUT I'LL COVER THIS. YOU ACTUALLY WERE ABLE TO LOOK AT 
TONYA'S CALLER I.D.? 
A. CORRECT. 
Q. YOU WERE AWARE THERE WAS A PHONE CALL THAT CAME AT 11:48? 
A. CORRECT. 
Q. P.M. ON THE 19TH OF MAY? 
A. RIGHT. CALLER I.D SAID 11:48. IT WAS CALL NUMBER 40. 
AND IT SHOWED FROM ELIZABETH STITT. 
Q. SHOWED FROM HER? 
A. YES. 
Q. DID YOU CONFIRM WITH HER THAT SHE HAD MADE THAT PHONE 
CALL? 
A. YES. 
MR. GRAVIS: YOUR HONOR, FOR THE RECORD, I WOULD 
AGREE WITH MR. DAINES THAT THIS IS HEARSAY. IT'S NOT BEING 
OFFERED FOR THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER ASSERTED, SIMPLY TO 
EXPLAIN WHAT OFFICER LUCAS DID AND WHY HE DID IT. 
MR. DAINES: THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. AND SO THE 
COURT AND THE JURY KNOWS, I HAVE TOLD MR. GRAVIS BECAUSE OF 
THE FACT THAT THIS CASE ACTUALLY STARTED FOUR DAYS LATER THAN 
IT WAS ORIGINALLY SET, WE LOST SOME WITNESSES UNTIL LATER IN 


























OF THAT, I WILL GO BACK AND COVER SOME OF THESE THINGS. 
MR. GRAVIS AGREES THAT IT CAN BE OFFERED NOT FOR THE TRUTH OF 
THE MATTER ASSERTED. IF WE ASSERT IT FOR THE TRUTH OF THE 
MATTER ASSERTED, WE MUST PROVE IT BY THE MORE ORIGINAL MEANS 
IN THE FUTURE, AND I WOULD PROFFER THAT WE WILL DO THAT. 
BUT — 
THE COURT: WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO DO IS TRANSLATE 
THAT INTO ENGLISH. ONE OF THE INSTRUCTIONS THAT I HAVE GIVEN 
YOU PREVIOUSLY INDICATES THAT SOMETIMES I'LL LIMIT THE REASON 
YOU CAN USE THE EVIDENCE YOU CAN USE THE EVIDENCE FOR A 
SPECIFIC PURPOSE. WE'PE NOT USING THIS EVIDENCE TO PROVE 
THAT ELIZABETH STITT DID CALL IN AT A CERTAIN TIME. WE'RE 
JUST USING THE EVIDENCE TO SHOW WHAT DETECTIVE LUCAS KNEW 
WHEN HE WAS LATER QUESTIONING OTHER PEOPLE. 
MR. DAINES: AND THIS WILL BE AN ONGOING THING. 
MR. GRAVIS: WILL BE OTHER WITNESSES THE SAME. 
THE COURT: SAME SITUATION. 
MR. GRAVIS YEAH, 
THE COURT: SO YOU CAN'T USE THIS STATEMENT THAT 
SOMEBODY CALLED IN AT 11:48 OR WHATEVER IT WAS. ELIZABETH 
STITT. YOU CAN'T USE IT TO PROVE WHAT SHE DID. WE'RE GOING 
TO HAVE TO HAVE HER TAKE THE STAND AND TESTIFY ABOUT WHEN SHE 
CALLED IN. YOU CAN ONLY USE IT TO SHOW THAT DETECTIVE LUCAS 
KNEW THAT A CALL HAD BEEN RECEIVED AT THAT TIME. OKAY. 
MR. DAINES: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
1 WELL? 
2 A. THEY CAME BACK, BUT WE DIDN'T HAVE THEM COME RIGHT BACK 
3 TO THE BED OF THE TRUCK. WE HAD THEM STAY TOWARDS THE FRONT 
4 OF THE HOME. AND WE SPOKE TO THEM AND STUFF. BUT WE DIDN'T 
5 WANT THEM TO COME BACK. IN OTHER WORDS, YOU GOT TO KEEP THEM 
6 OUT OF THE SCENE AREA THAT YOU ARE WORKING IN. THEY ARE NOT 
7 NEXT TO THE BED. THEY ARE OUT IN THE FRONT. 
8 Q. YOU INDICATED YOU FOUND A HAT THERE? 
9 A. YES. 
10 Q. DID YOU IDENTIFY THE OWNER OF THE HAT? 
11 A. YES. 
12 Q. DESCRIBE FOR THE JURY HOW THIS HAPPENED? 
13 A. WHEN THE HAT CAME CUT, WE SHOWED THE HAT TO DARINDA AND 
14 ASKED HER, DO YOU HAVE ANY IDEA WHO'S HAT THIS IS. AND THERE 
15 WAS A BOY THERE. I THINK HIS FIRST NAME IS DANIEL NOW AS I 
16 RECALL. AND HE SAYS, YEAH. THAT LOOKS LIKE SOMEBODY I KNOW. 
17 AND I SAYS, WELL, WHOSE IS IT? AND HE SAYS, I THINK THAT'S 
18 DAMIAN MOORE'S HAT. AND DARINDA SAYS, NO. NO. THAT'S NOT 
19 IT. THAT'S NOT DAMIAN'S. AND THEN THEY BOTH REALIZED, OH, 
20 THIS IS EDWARD SPINKS* HAT. 
21 Q. ALL RIGHT. NOW, THIS IS — NOW, WHAT TIME OF DAY? 
22 A. LET ME SEE THAT CONSENT TO SEARCH. THERE'S A TIME AT THE 
23 TOP OF THAT. 
24 Q. ALL RIGHT. 











































Q. DID YOU LEARN SOMETHING ABOUT THIS CASE THAT MORNING IN 
TALKING TO HER? 
A. YES. 
Q. WHAT DID YOU LEARN? 
A. THAT EDWARD SPINKS HAD MADE A PHONE CALL FROM TONYA'S 
HOUSE OVER TO 2470 "B" AVENUE AT 11:23 P.M. 
AND DID YOU — DID SHE TELL YOU HOW SHE HAD LEARNED THAT? 
FROM SPEAKING TO DARINDA BLANKENSHIP. 
Q 
A 
DID YOU GO BACK OVER TO TALK TO DARINDA? 
YES. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. 














— AND IF I GO ' 
: THAT 
WE'VE AGREED TO; IS 
S CORRECT. 












SHE AROSE IN THE MORNING 



























MORNING OF THE 20TH OF MAY. AND OF COURSE THEY LIVE IN WEST 
OGDEN. THIS IS 2470, LESS THAN A BLOCK AWAY, HAD HEARD THAT 
PERSON SHE KNEW, TONYA STEVENS, HAD BEEN MURDERED OVERNIGHT. 
SHE WENT TO HER PHONE AND ON HER CALLER I.D. SAW THAT THERE 
HAD BEEN A PHONE CALL MADE FROM HER FRIEND TONYA'S HOUSE TO 
HER PHONE OR THE PHONE AT 2470 "B" AVENUE AT 11:23 P.M. THE 
NIGHT BEFORE, THE 19TH OF MAY. 
AND HER TESTIMONY WOULD FURTHER BE THAT SHE GOT ON THE 
TELEPHONE, CALLED THE DEFENDANT AND SAID, WHAT'S THIS ALL 
ABOUT. AND HE SAID, I MADE THE TELEPHONE CALL. 
MR. GRAVIS: YOUR HONOR, THAT PART I DON'T BELIEVE 
WE STIPULATED TO. 
MR. DAINES: BUT YOU STIPULATE THAT HE THEN SAID, I 
MADE THAT PHONE CALL. 
MR. GRAVIS: AGAIN, THE STIPULATION WAS THAT THE 
CALL WAS MADE AT 11:23. 
MR. DAINES: BY HIM. WE STIPULATED TO THAT TOO. I 
18 HAVE IT WRITTEN HERE. 
MR. GRAVIS: MY MEMORY IS ABOUT LIKE YOURS. MY 
MEMORY IS ABOUT LIKE YOURS. IF YOU'VE GOT IT WRITTEN DOWN. 
OKAY. 
MR. DAINES: THAT HE MADE THE PHONE CALL. HE SAID 
THAT HE MADE THE PHONE CALL. 
MR. GRAVIS: SHE WOULD TESTIFY THAT HE SAID HE MADE 


























MR. DAINES: YES. YOUR HONOR, CAN YOU INSTRUCT THE 
JURY ON THE STIPULATION. 
THE COURT: THAT'S A STIPULATION WHERE THE PARTIES 
AGREE THAT A PARTICULAR WITNESS WOULD TESTIFY TO A PARTICULAR 
THING. YOU MAY ACCEPT THAT AS BEING TRUE. 
BY MR. DAINES: 
Q. IS THIS THE FIRST YOU HAD KNOWN ABOUT THIS? 
A. YES. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. AFTER YOU SPOKE TO DARINDA AND YOU HAD 
LEARNED THIS, WHO DID YOU SPEAK TO? DO YOU REMEMBER? 
A. YOU MEAN JOLETTA. 
Q. NO. I DON'T MEAN JOLETTA. WELL, YOU'VE PREVIOUSLY SAID 
YOU SPOKE TO MRS. RAY? 
A. YES. 
Q. ON THE TELEPHONE IN BRIGHAM. DID YOU TALK TO HER IN 
PERSON? 
A. YES. 
Q. WHERE DID YOU TALK TO HER? 
A. SHE HAD ACTUALLY COME TO THE HOUSE. SHE WAS THERE AT THE 
HOUSE. 
Q. AND DID YOU SHOW HER ANYTHING ON THAT DAY THE, 21ST OF 
MAY? 
A. YES. ACTUALLY, PRIOR TO THAT, THEY HAD TOLD ME THAT THEY 
HAD A PICTURE WITH EDWARD SPINKS WEARING THE HAT THAT WE HAD. 

























A. AND SO I SAYS, WHERE IS IT. AND SHE SAYS, WE HAVEN'T GOT 
THEM DEVELOPED YET. I SAYS, LET'S TAKE THEM TO WALMART AND 
I'LL HAVE THEM DEVELOPED IN AN HOUR. 
Q. SO THIS IS SUNDAY, THE 21ST OF MAY NOW, RIGHT? 
A. IT IS. SO I DROVE DARINDA AND MRS. RAY TO WALMART. WE 
WENT AND DEVELOPED THE PHOTOS AND THIS IS THE PHOTO THAT I 
HAVE WITH HIM WEARING THE HAT THAT THEY HAD TAKEN. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. 
NOW, THIS HAS TO BE MARKED. AND FOR THE RECORD, YOUR 
HONOR, THERE IS ALREADY AN EXHIBIT MARKING ON THIS WHICH 
DOESN'T HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH THIS CASE. THIS WAS THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING. MAY WE PUT THE EXHIBIT OVER THIS MARK? 
THE COURT: YES. 
MR. DAINES: DO YOU HAVE AMY OBJECTION? 
MR. GRAVIS: NO. I AGREE IT WAS USED IN THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING. 
BY MR. DAINES: 
Q. SO YOU TOOK FILM TO WALMART TO HAVE DEVELOPED. THEN DID 
YOU PICK IT UP? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND CALLING YOUR ATTENTION THEN TO WHAT HAS BEEN MARKED 
STATE'S EXHIBIT NUMBER 29. IS THAT THE PHOTOGRAPH YOU PICKED 
UP? 
A. YES, 


























A. EDWARD SPINKS. 
Q. AND DOES THAT HAT APPEAR TO BE THE HAT THAT YOU HAD FOUND 





AND — OKAY. 
YOU HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THIS BEING ENTERED INTO 
EVIDENCE; IS THAT CORRECT? 
MR. GRAVIS: NO OBJECTION. 
MR. DAINES: AT THIS TIME WE WOULD MOVE FOR ENTRY OF 
STATE'S EXHIBIT NUMBER 2 9, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: RECEIVED. 
MR. DAINES: MAY I APPROACH THE BENCH? THANK YOU. 
Q. DID YOU SHOW MRS. RAY THE CLOTHING THAT YOU HAD FOUND THE 
PREVIOUS NIGHT? 
A. YES. AFTER THE PHOTOGRAPH, WE THEN DROVE OVER TO WHERE 
THE CLOTHING WAS AT THE CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATIVE UNIT AND 
THEN SHOWED HER THE LEVI PANTS AND WHAT SHE IDENTIFIED AS 
BEING EDWARD SPINKS, THE UNDERWEAR BEING EDWARD SPINKS. 
Q. AND SHE SAID SHE WASHED THESE? 
A. RIGHT. I ASKED HER HOW SHE KNEW THAT. SHE SAID, I DO 
HIS WASH, SO I RECOGNIZE THE CLOTHING. THE SHIRT SHE WASN'T 
REALLY SURE OF. SHE SAID, I COULDN'T TELL YOU IF THE SHIRT IS 
HIS OR NOT. 
Q. DID YOU ALSO INTERVIEW SHELDON REEVES? 
